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Introduction
Monetary policy is a fundamental part of a nation's economic decision-
making. Probably the most direct manner in which it impinges upon us as
individuals is in the setting of interest rates. These rates greatly affect our
choices between consumption and saving both in the present and at vari-
ous periods in the future.' Mortgages, college loans, and even (to some)
everyday consumption decisions are examples of how interest rates may
become central in modern life. Yet, despite their ubiquity in the lives of
those living in the West, interest rate decisions have been placed outside of
the core of political decision-making. Western democracies have vested
decision-making authority for setting the level of interest rates in an inde-
pendent actor: central banks. 2 This institutional design, it turns out, is
largely a formal legal arrangement, and a good one at that.3
This Note applies the legal theory of form, posited by Robert S. Sum-
mers, 4 to an area usually thought of as being dominated by substance:
monetary policy. It focuses primarily on the question of the cumulative
effects of choices of (legal) form in carrying out monetary policy. It posits
that the successful reduction of the perverse influence of politics in the
monetary policy of Western democracies can be credited to the choice of a
specific legal form. This Note's primary hypothesis is that a certain kind
of legal form deserves a major portion of the credit for the success that
1. See F. A. Hayek, Time-Preference and Productivity: A Reconsideration, 7
EcONOMICA, Feb. 1945, at 22, 22-25.
2. For a more detailed account of why the mature democracies of the West have
turned to central bank independence, see discussion, infra subsection II (A)-(B). For
deeper theoretical (i.e., substantive) treatment, see ALBERTO ALESINA & GUIDO TABEILINI,
A POSITIVE THEORY OF FISCAL DEFICITS AND GOVERNMENT DEBT IN A DEMOCRACY 1-38
(Nat'l Bureau of Econ. Research, Working Paper No. 2308, 1987), available at http://
papers.nber.org/papers/w2308.pdf; Alberto Alesina & Jeffrey Sachs, Political Parties and
the Business Cycle in the United States, 1948- 1984, 20J. MONEY, CREDIT & BANKING 63-
82 (1988); Alberto Alesina & Lawrence H. Summers, Central Bank Independence and
Macroeconomic Performance: Some Comparative Evidence, 25J. MONEY, CREDIT & BANKING
151-62 (1993).
3. See, e.g., Beware of Heroes: Faith in Central Banks Tends to Overshoot - just like
Stockmarkets, ECONOMIST, Apr. 14, 2001, at 17-18 [hereinafter Beware of Heroes] (argu-
ing that central banks have done a "superb job, pushing inflation rates to 30-year lows").
4. See generally ROBERT S. SUMMERS, FORMAL LEGAL THEORY (forthcoming 2003)
(draft on file with author) (defining, explaining, and applying the concept of form in
legal analysis).
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these democracies have had in achieving the goals of price stability and
sustainable economic growth.
In broad strokes, Summers' theory of legal form posits that at the most
fundamental level a law-abiding, democratic society's most vital decisions
are formal in nature. Summers argues that the uncontroverted values
expressed in the most basic principles of the rule of law are essentially
formal, for they establish: "(1) that basic social relations are to be governed
by law"5 -meaning that whatever its substance, law normally prevails over
any contrary substantive reasons (a highly formal value); "(2) that such
law is generally to take the form of clear rules" 6 -meaning that clarity,
regardless of content, must occur so that addressees can understand and
decide to comply; "(3) that officials are subject to the law, too' 7 -meaning
that substantive differences between inhabitants and officials should not
displace generality, a clearly content-free legal value; and (4) "that [all
addressees] are entitled to due process of law" 8 -meaning that all address-
ees, regardless of differences in status, occupation, etc. are entitled to the
formalities of due notice and opportunity for hearing. Thus, at its most
fundamental level, law in the democratic societies of the West has a con-
tent-independent, formal nature. 9
Adopting Summers' conception of law as essentially formal and con-
tent-independent, this Note then explores the extent to which societies have
gotten form right, and when they have not. For purposes of this Note, let
us characterize appropriate legal form as that which yields substantive con-
tent that furthers the basic values of democracy and the rule of law, namely
rationality, predictability, fairness and accountability.' 0
In the interest of space and clarity, this Note will evaluate the impact
of form solely in the monetary policy area. This area of public policy is
particularly well-suited for this task because "good" or "bad" form can be
detected by looking at the effects of any given formal legal arrangement in
terms of its result. Form will be deemed good or appropriate when eco-
nomic growth, social well-being and political stability follow its adoption. '
Therefore, this Note will compare and contrast the experience of Western
democracies having independent central banks with that of Argentina, a
5. ROBERT S. SUMMERS, The Form of Law-lihe Governance- Rule of Law, Chapter 11 in




9. See Manuel Atienza, Preface to the First Edition of ROBERT S. SUMMERS, LA
NATURALEZA FORMAL DEI_ DERECHO (2001).
10. Though a simplification, this characterization largely covers Summers' descrip-
tion of the values that may be realized through the use of appropriate form. See ROBERT
S. SUMMERS, Primary Concepts and General Approach, Chapter 2 in FORMAL LEGAL THEORY
(forthcoming 2003) (draft at 39-44, on file with author).
11. Our definition of appropriate form in the monetary policy area can be shown to
be a special case of Summers' broader definition of appropriate form as "form suffi-
ciently designed to serve the relevant purposes which may, in turn, be further analyzed
in terms of policies, fundamental political values, and general legal values associated
with the rule of law." Id. at 29.
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country that chose to forego sovereignty over monetary policy altogether.
By highlighting the differences in the formal designs adopted in these two
monetary policy regimes, this Note intends not only to sharpen the readers'
understanding of the differences between good and bad form, but also to
explain how legal form strongly impacts policy-content.
Section I provides the theoretical background for this Note by describ-
ing and explaining the theory of legal form. Section II explains why mod-
ern Western democracies have opted for restricting the role of politics in
the monetary policy area by granting greater autonomy (if not indepen-
dence altogether) to presumably nonpolitical entities -central banks.
Toward that end, this Note will utilize a somewhat unorthodox method-
ological approach-let us call it "Ulyssesian Methodology." This approach
is used by James Buchanan and his colleagues in the Constitutional Politi-
cal Economy School. 12 This Note will refer to the Ulyssesian dilemma of
having to decide between two time-inconsistent goals: that of listening to
the songs of the Sirens and that of returning home safely after a long war.
Throughout this Note, Ulysses and the approach he took to cope with his
dilemma will be looked upon as the "paradigmatic case of self-binding."' 3
This Note will draw parallels between Ulysses' dilemma and a dilemma
that presents itself in the carrying out of macroeconomic policy in all mod-
ern societies-both of which require the use of some method of self-
binding. 14
Section III addresses how choosing to surrender political control of
monetary policy largely corresponds to a choice of good legal form. Many
attribute the economic vibrancy of the West in the last three decades to a
choice of macroeconomic architecture that created a stable economic envi-
ronment highly conducive to economic certainty. t 5 To explain how good
legal form-illustrated here by independent central banks-can contribute
to good policy content-resulting in macroeconomic certainty and stabil-
ity-this Note will rely on Summers' linear progression analysis as a
12. In the words of its founder and economics Nobel laureate, James Buchanan:
Constitutional political economy is a research program that directs inquiry to
the working properties of rules, and institutions within which individuals inter-
act, and the processes through which these rules and institutions are chosen or
come into being. The emphasis on the choice of constraints distinguishes this
research program from conventional economics, while the emphasis on coopera-
tive rather than conflictual interaction distinguishes the program from much of
conventional political science.
James M. Buchanan, The Domain of Constitutional Political Economics, 1 CONST. POL.
ECON. 1 (1990). Note, however, that while the narrative approach I take derives from the
Constitutional Political Economy approach, I ground my analysis on the legal theory of
form.
13. SeeJON ELSTER, ULYSSES UNBOUND: STUDIES IN RATIONALITY, PRECOMMITTMENT, AND
CONSTRAINTS 275 (2000).
14. Note that the Ulysses metaphor is not strange to Summers' lifetime work as a
contracts scholar. For, as Elster suggests, a simple example of self-binding "is the use of
contract law to make promises credible." See id. at 272.
15. See Navigators in Troubled Waters, ECONOMIST, Sept. 25, 1999, at 3-6; Beware of
Heroes, supra note 3, at 75.
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method of showing the cumulative effects of choices of form. 16
Section IV of this Note discusses another example of self-binding in
the monetary policy area, which takes on an entirely different form than
central bank independence: the strict currency board. The Argentine gov-
ernment adopted this formal legal arrangement in 1991 as an attempt to
control inflation, introduce economic stability, and, most importantly,
reestablish the government's long-lost credibility in economic matters. 17
Contrasting this mode of self-binding with central bank independence, this
Note intends to illustrate how inappropriate form led to bad policy content.
The Note then concludes with both a lesson and a warning: while much of
public policy is inherently substantive in nature, if legislators and policy-
makers choose to ignore the properties of legal form, particularly how such
properties create and mold legal content, they do so at their peril.
I. What Counts as Form?
A. The Concept of Form in Legal Analysis
The concept of form is both the starting point and the means by which
Summers develops a legal theory that does not reduce law to a universe
defined merely by rules or norms. 18 To Summers, the positivists' 19 rule-
oriented approach offers a limited view of the legal universe and surely
cannot fully account for the presence of formal values in the fundamental
notion of "rule of law."'20 Summers thus develops a legal theory that
accounts for the fundamental values expressed in the rule of law-which
are formal in nature-while providing an interpretation of how these values
are articulated by formal and non-formal elements in the legal world as
part of a multifaceted social activity commonly called "the law."2 '
The role of form both in shaping and in giving content to the law is
best perceived by observing the fact that Western democratic societies
seem to share some core features and values in their conceptualizations of
16. Summers' linear progression analysis illustrates how early choices of form influ-
ence other legal choices further down the legislative/implementive path, and also impact
on substantive content of legal concepts/actions. This is what we mean by "cumulative
effects of choices of form." See SUMMERS, Cumulative Effects of Choices of Form, Chapter
10 in FORMAL LEGAL THEORY (forthcoming 2003) (draft at 2, on file with author).
17. See, e.g., Dollar Mad? Argentina's troubles have increased doubts about currency
boards, ECONOMIST, Oct. 27, 2001, at 72 [hereinafter Dollar Mad?].
18. See Atienza, supra note 9.
19. The Legal Positivists are represented mainly by Hans Kelsen and H.L.A. Hart and
their followers. See generally H.L.A. HART, THE CONCEPT OF LAW (2d ed. 1994) (discuss-
ing the philosophical foundations of legal positivism in American law); HANS KELSEN,
GENERAL THEORY OF LAW AND STATE (1945) (discussing the philosophical foundations of
legal positivism in the civil law system).
20. See, e.g., ROBERT S. SUMMERS, The Form of Law- Like Governance-Rule of Law,
Chapter 11 in FORMAL LEGAL THEORY (forthcoming 2003) (draft at 11-16, on file with
author) (criticizing Kelsen and Hart and outlining the formal principles of the rule of
law).
21. See id.
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the rule of law, and that these features are essentially formal in nature. 22
Take, for example, the notion that social relations ought to be governed by
law, that law should be expressed in the form of legal rules, or that like
addressees, public officials are also subject to the law. All these basic prin-
ciples of the rule of law are legal expressions of form, that is, they describe
how social relationships ought to be structured and how different social
interactions are going to be approached from a legal perspective, but not
the specific content of the law applicable in a given circumstance. In Sum-
mers' words, these principles "do not directly determine the specific con-
tent of legal relations between legal persons ... [i]nstead, they specify the
general shape of ... law that in turn determines the content of these rela-
tions."23 This is what he means by saying that the principles of the rule of
law, in the democratic societies of the West, have a substantive-indepen-
dent, formal nature. 24
Having a substantive-independent nature means that legal form is not
subject to the boundaries that normally limit the reach of substantive legal
concepts. 25 The consequences of this insight are profound. First, it per-
mits us to see that form can express itself systemically, that is, across dif-
ferent content areas. 26 Second, by organizing and integrating different
legal phenomena under an umbrella of formal principles, form establishes
the contours of different areas of the legal universe.2 7 Legal phenomena
such as institutions, statutes, contracts, interpretive methodologies, and
operational techniques are manifestations of the rule of law at lower levels
22. Summers sums up the essential and inherently formal principles of the rule of
law as follows:
[S]o far as feasible, the law is to take the form of general rules; those rules are to
be clear and definite; any new law is to be publicly promulgated or otherwise
made publicly accessible; the citizenry is generally to have advance notice of the
effective date of new law and ready access thereto; new written law is generally
to be prospective rather than retrospective in operation; bodies of law are to be
free of conflicts; all law is to be interpreted or applied in accord with appropriate
methodologies generally understood in advance; prior to any significant denial
of [a] claimed right, adverse grant of remedy, or imposition of a sanction, the
party to be adversely affected is to have an opportunity to contest such action
before an independent and impartial body in accord with due process; and so
on.
ROBERT S. SUMMFRS, Features Unifying Phenomena into the Form of a System, Chapter 9 in
FORMAL LEGAL THEORY (forthcoming 2003) (draft at 28, on file with author).
23. SUMMERS, supra note 5, at 4. The reader should be reminded that while the ideo-
logical, political, and philosophical beliefs that inspired the adoption of these formal
principles in Western countries' legal systems are essentially substantive ideas, they
were introduced in these legal systems as formal, abstract values, devoid of any specific
policy (in the public policy sense) content. It is in this sense that Summers and this
author refer to these principles as being formal in nature. See SUMMERS, infra notes 25-
26.
24. In Summers' words, "the principles of the rule of law include only form-oriented
content, whereas first-order laws have non-formal[,] policy content." Id.
25. For Summers (and for us), "individual principles of the rule of law generally
have far wider scope of application than individual first order [i.e., substantive-based]
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of abstraction, and, thus, reflect those basic formal principles of the rule of
law.
It is with such an eye to the influence of form in all legal phenomena
that Summers defines legal form as "a systematic purposive arrangement"
for a certain legal phenomenon. 28 Legal form's overall guiding and "tying-
together" properties allow it to irradiate the core values of the rule of law to
the whole legal universe, affecting, in this process, individuals, govern-
ment, society, institutions, statutes, and even ways of thinking about the
law. To illustrate the operation of legal form throughout the legal system,
Summers develops a typology of legal phenomena.2 9
B. The Typology of Legal Form
Summers separates legal phenomena into species that reflect areas where
the interaction between form and complex human activity have been most
fecund in the law: institutional, preceptual, non-preceptual, methodologi-
cal, and systemic legal phenomena. 30 Legal phenomena are thus the units
of analysis of Summers' legal theory of form. 3 1 Because of legal form's
dynamic impact in the legal system, it continually shapes the content of
legal relationships in society. Summers' formal theory captures this dyna-
mism largely because of the holistic view it takes in seeing legal phenom-
ena as not only the result of form (which would amount to form-
determinism), but rather as the result of the interaction between formal
and non-formal elements within phenomena of law, 3 2 including the legal
system as a whole.3 3
II. Ulysses' Return to Ithaca and a Modern Dilemma
Though Ulysses is an individual, this Note posits that he can be viewed as
representing society as a whole as he agonizes between choices that are
differently attractive and mutually inconsistent in terms of the short- and
long-term goals they present. Like Ulysses who was caught in the dilemma
of listening to the beautiful song of the Sirens or returning home after a
long period of war, 3 4 modern societies face the conflict between two mutu-
ally inconsistent goals: greater present consumption and sustained eco-
nomic growth in the future. By exploring Ulysses' plight during this
pivotal moment, we can discern what was formal and what was substantive
in Ulysses' dilemma. After considering Ulysses' plight, it will be possible to
recreate and connect him with the larger social, political, legal, and institu-
tional context of interest-rate decisions in modern democratic societies.
28. ROBERT S. SUMMERS, Forms for Legal Phenomena and Why They Matter, Chapter 1
in FORMAL LEGAL THEORY (forthcoming 2003) (draft at 1, on file with author).
29. See id. at 3.
30. See SUMMERS, supra note 10, at 2.
31. See SUMMERS, supra note 28, at 1.
32. See Atienza, supra note 9, at ix.
33. See SUMMERS, supra note 10, at 2.
34. See generally 1 ODYSSEY, BooK VI (A.T. Murray trans. 1919, reprinted in the Loeb
Classical Library 1974).
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This study of Ulysses' dilemma will also shed light into why the change
from politically- to non-politically-based interest rate decision-making
became necessary.3 5
A. Ulysses and Appropriate Form, or Why Ulysses Made it Home
In Book VI of the Odyssey, and at some point in his return home to Ithaca,
the exquisite voices of the Sirens singing from an island not far from his
ship's course captivated Ulysses.36 At that point there was nothing to pre-
vent him from listening to them while continuing his trip. However, he
recognized that the power of these voices was such that if he steered the
ship ever closer to the reefs where the Sirens were located, his ship would
be wrecked and he would be unable to continue his journey.
In modern economic terms, Ulysses faced a problem of time inconsis-
tency in his optimal plan.37 His optimal plan was to listen to the Sirens
and then continue his journey. 38 But this was time-inconsistent, because
once he embarked on the plan of listening to the Sirens, he would not be
able to implement and accomplish the latter part of the plan-returning
home.3 9 By contrast, a time-consistent optimal plan is one that would
specify a sequence of actions, one for each moment in time, which enjoys
the property that the individual will actually choose in each time period
the action specified by the plan.40 Thus, as time elapses, the individual
having undertaken a previously planned action will still choose the next
35. For a brilliant account and broader political-economic interpretation of this nar-
rative, see ELSTER, supra note 13, at 88-174. See also JON ELSTER, ULYSSES AND THE
SIRENS: STUDIES IN RATIONALITY AND IRRATIONALITY 37 (1979) (presenting and introducing
the notion of self-binding as a solution to the problem of weakness of will).
36. See ODYSSEY, supra note 34, at 216-17.
37. See ELSTER, supra note 35, at 65-66.
38. See generally ODYSSEY, supra note 34.
39. In other words, the beautiful song of the Sirens had the effect of endogenously
changing Ulysses' preferences as he sailed by, which was the change he deliberately set
out to resist. See ELSTER, supra note 35, at 77-78.
40. Professor Elster formally enunciates "self-binding" as a series of steps:
(i) Itlo bind oneself is to carry out a certain decision at time t, in order to
increase the probability that one will carry out another decision at time t2.
(ii) If the act at the earlier time has the effect of inducing a change in the set of
options that will be available at the later time, then this does not count as bind-
ing oneself ....
(iii) The effect of carrying out the decision at t, must be to set up some causal
process in the external world ....
(iv) The resistance against carrying out the decision at t, must be smaller than
the resistance that would have opposed the carrying out of the decision at t2 had
the decision at t, not intervened.
(v) The act of binding oneself must be an act of commission, not of omission."
ELSTER, supra note 35, at 39-46. This distinction will later prove very useful to explain
what Argentina did by deciding to abolish its central bank. See discussion infra subsec-
tion IV(B).
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planned action as the best action rather than some other, and so on.4' If
such a time-consistent plan exists, all the individual has to do is follow the
plan, or failing that, subject himself to unknown or less ascertainable cir-
cumstances. However, Ulysses' biggest problem when he encountered the
Sirens was not that he had time-inconsistent goals-a matter of sub-
stance4 2 -but that he did not even have a plan (a problem of lack of form).
1. Ulysses' Challenge: Time-Inconsistency of Goals Due to a Lack of
Binding Form
Looking from a detached perspective, and seeing the effect that the Sirens
had on Ulysses, one can clearly see that a time-inconsistency problem
arose from the fact that as time passed, proximity to the Sirens was affect-
ing Ulysses' preferences. His perception of what would constitute the best
action or series of actions at one moment changed in the next as he devi-
ated from what he had just decided to do. 43 But Ulysses had a saving
insight: aware of what was happening to him, he decided he needed a plan
of action. Significantly, he made this decision without yet knowing what
the specific substantive content of such a plan would be. 44 At that point,
coming up with a plan that made his then time-inconsistent goals compati-
ble was solely a matter of "mechanism design," or the formal arrangement
of priorities and roles yet unarticulated. In other words, that was the
moment when Ulysses realized he needed a formal purposive arrangement
that could help him solve the time-inconsistency of his goals.
Ulysses then elaborated an "optimal plan" in which he came up with
the idea of denying himself his legitimate right to decide the ship's course
at some point in the future. He instructed his men to tie him up to the
mast and ignore any orders to do anything other than sail away from the
reefs after some pre-established, planned point. To assure total compliance
from his crew, Ulysses told them to plug their ears and row.4 5
41. This is largely illustrative of step (iv) in Elster's formal definition of self-binding.
See ELSTER, supra note 35, at 46.
42. Generally, economic analysis focuses on making choices within exogenously set
constraints -time and financial resources being common constraints. See, e.g.,
Buchanan, supra note 12, at 2-3 ("In the elementary textbook formulation of demand
theory, for example, the individual consumer-purchaser confronts a range of goods
available at a set of prices, but is restricted by the size of the budget."). Choosing among
a range of goods within a budget constraint clearly indicates that the nature of these
choices is substantive, not formal. The formal approach developed in this Note looks
beyond this model: "[W]e [constitutional political economists] observe that individuals
do, in fact, choose their own constraints, at least to a degree and within some limits." Id.
at 3.
43. That is, in Elster's terminology, Ulysses' preferences are endogenously changing.
See ELSTER, supra note 35, at 77-78.
44. Elster poignantly illustrates this point, distinguishing between "the choice of an
action and the choice of a way of choosing." See id. at 13. In Summers' terminology the
first choice is a substantive matter, the second a formal one. See SUMMERS supra note 5,
at 34; discussion accompanying Section 1.
45. In Ulysses' words: "'. . . . but you must bind me hard and fast, so that I cannot
stir from the spot where you will stand me . . . and if I beg you to release me, you must
tighten and add to my bonds.'. See, e.g., ELSTER, supra note 35, at 36 (quoting THE
ODYSSEY).
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2. Ulysses' Mechanism Design: Submitting Oneself to Binding Rules
Ulysses' plan was a set of binding rules that completely constrained his
future choices. By using elements of his natural, social, and institutional
environment, Ulysses managed to subvert certain destructive, yet irresisti-
ble inclinations of his near-future self. His preferences were endogenously
changing with the closer proximity to the Sirens.
46
Ulysses' plan is quite illustrative of the dilemma facing today's mone-
tary authorities, namely the need to sacrifice greater short-term economic
growth by raising interest rates in the present to curb inflationary pres-
sures, so that price stability and stable growth can be attained in the
future. His plan also casts light on another choice Western societies would
make only centuries later: that of living under the rule of law rather than
under the law of the ruler.4 7
B. Ulysses and Today's Democracies: Some Surprising Parallels
Like certain societies of the future, Ulysses decided to bind himself to a
form-oriented plan because that is the price one has to pay to restrict the
conduct of others. 4 8 Choosing to limit the scope of choices at such a fun-
damental level allowed both Ulysses and, centuries later, Western societies,
to make great advances on the road to freedom. Here as later, form coun-
tered the tendency for free agency to degenerate into chaos.
The tendency of democracies to degenerate toward chaos is illustrated
by a familiar agonizing choice that government officials face in all modern
societies: continue on an inflationary course and fuel each threatened
downturn with new money and credit, or resolutely place limits upon the
growth of the money supply via the sale of treasury bonds.4 9 To follow the
first course eventually threatens the stability of the social order, 50 but to
take the second route has short-run ill effects in terms of high interest rates
and greater unemployment.5 1 In democracies, the second path also leads
46. See id. at 77-7 8.
47. For a most insightful account of the political-economic dynamics involved in this
change, see, for example, Mancur Olson, Dictatorship, Democracy, and Development, 87
AM. POL. Sci. REV. 567, 567-76 (1993).
48. Some argue that Ulysses' being tied to the mast is the figurative equivalent of
adopting a constitution. See, e.g., ELSTER, supra note 13, at 94-95. Incidentally, and
quite tellingly, the logo of the Constitutional Political Economy Journal is a drawing of
Ulysses tied to the mast. See Buchanan, supra note 12, at 1.
49. Selling treasury bonds in the open market mops up money stored in bank
reserves, which then increases interest rates. For a more detailed explanation, see
Monopoly Power over Money, ECONOMIST, Nov. 20, 1995, at 95.
50. Indeed, the disintegration of German democracy that ended the Weimar Repub-
lic is largely blamed on the inflationary policies adopted during that period. See, e.g.,
ELSTER, supra note 13, at 164 (arguing that the German Bundesbank acquired its inde-
pendence "as a response to the inflationary trauma of the 1920s"); but see id. at 164 n.
163 (citing E. Dehay, L'example allemand d'independence de la banque centrale
(1998)). Dehay argues that the "legislation that established the independence of the
Bundesbank is better explained as a compromise between the federal government and
the governments of the Lander ... than as an abdication by politicians who had learned
not to trust themselves as guardians of monetary policy." Id.
51. See F. A. HAYEK, INDIVIDUALISM AND ECONOMIC ORDER (1948).
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more quickly to the loss of government and legislative offices. 52
Finally, by binding a group of actors to a pre-established formal
arrangement where the scope of discretion is limited (and not tainted by
what then appears as politically expedient), both Ulysses and Western
democracies position themselves to solve the problem of time-inconsis-
tency of their goals. 53 In carrying out their part of the plan, public offi-
cials, like Ulysses, ultimately contribute to the cause of democracy
(through political and economic stability) and freedom.5 4 Jhering perhaps
put it best when he remarked that "Form is the sworn enemy of the arbi-
trary, the twin sister of freedom." 55 Drawing upon this insight, this Note
now clarifies how appropriate legal form paves the way to political and
economic stability and freedom.
III. Cumulative Effects of Choices of Form
A. How Appropriate Form Contributes to Appropriate Content
As mentioned above, this Note focuses on Ulysses' plight not only to show
the necessity and profound effects of form, but also to demonstrate how
appropriate form contributes to appropriate content. 56 Accordingly, the
52. Note that inflation does not merely encourage social and political conflict. Long
inflationary periods produce short time horizons within the public (i.e., strong bias for
present consumption coupled with heavy discounting of the utility of consumption in
the future), making it ever less amenable to the necessary policy changes. However, the
temptation of officials to buy short-run support with inflation is also self-defeating. The
resulting rise in time preferences and the growing loss of value in cash holdings make
the public ever more inclined to lose patience with officialdom. Indeed, a public histori-
cally accustomed to short time horizons demands satisfaction-and quickly. See gener-
ally ADAM PRZEWORSKI, DEMOCRACY AND THE MARKET: POLITICAL AND ECONOMIC REFORMS IN
EASTERN EUROPE AND LATIN AMERICA (1991).
53. ELSTER, supra note 13, at 153 (asserting that: "[t]he creation of independent cen-
tral banks illustrates the idea of separation of powers as a precommitment device to
overcome time-inconsistency").
54. The Economist summed up this problem quite concisely:
Monetary policy affects the economy only after a long lag, so policymakers need
a long time horizon. Short-sighted politicians might try to engineer a boom
before an election, hoping that inflation would not rise until after the votes have
been counted. An independent central bank shielded from political pressures is
more likely to give priority to price stability; as a result its policies are seen by
financial markets as more credible. An independent central bank can therefore
deliver both lower inflation and more stable growth.
Fiscal Flexibility: Could Finance Ministers Learn a Few Tricks from Central Bankers?,
ECONOMIST, Nov. 27, 1999, at 80.
55. RUDOLF VON JHERING, 2 DER GEIST DES ROMISCHEN RECHTS 471 (1993).
56. Note that by stating that good form contributes to good content, I do not intend
to imply that form alone is to receive credit here. There is no doubt that substantive
knowledge derived from the development of the field of macroeconomics guides the
interpretation of the hard economic data that today's central banks look into. But the
fact that central bankers have such substantive knowledge is actually a matter of secon-
dary importance. For instance, Venezuelan central bankers trained in the United States
also share such knowledge, yet they cannot act according to their training. The crucial
difference is that they are not operating within a formal institutional framework where
they are independent of what political agents might want them to do. Form here,
indeed, makes all the difference.
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goal herein is to demonstrate the effect of form on content through an
abbreviated analysis of the cumulative effects of choices of form on a spe-
cific problem: the elimination of politically-generated business cycles by
the depoliticization of interest rate decisions in Western democracies. 57
Following Summers' methodological scheme, the main stages of the
linear progression that link the choice of a formal solution to its concrete
manifestation as a legal phenomenon are:
A. determination of the appropriate basic technique;
B. selection of law-making participants;
C. establishment of a legislative institution;
D. creation of the primary statutory law by the legislature;
E. promulgation and dissemination of the law, and education of primary
addressees of the law as to the form and content of this law;
F. application of the law by its addressees in ordinary cases;
G. the role of administrative officials and the (unlikely) judicial disposition
of disputes.5 8
Initially, choices of form are only bounded by the original formal pur-
pose they are designed to serve-in this and in Ulysses' case, that of solving
the conflict between two time-inconsistent goals. But each of the stages of
the above linear progression requires making certain choices of form, and,
generally, such choices will be both form-constrained (by previous choices
of form) and form constraining (on subsequent choices of form).
B. The Cumulative Effect of Choices of Form in Macroeconomic Policy
1. Determination of the Appropriate Basic Operational Technique
All basic forms of legal phenomena, be they institutional, preceptual, or
non-preceptual, are implemented through one, or more, of five operational
techniques: the grievance-remedial, the penal, the administrative-regula-
tory, the public-benefit conferral or the private-arranging technique. 59 For
the problem this Note focuses on-that of solving the conflict between the
mutually inconsistent goals of greater present consumption and greater
economic growth in the future-Congress chose to use the administrative-
regulatory technique. 60
But why did Congress choose this technique? The forward-looking
nature of any legislation designed to curb political management of interest
rate policy for short-term electoral gain appears to be the most compelling
57. This analysis is abbreviated because in presenting the progression involving the
creation and implementation of a statutory rule in the administrative-regulatory tech-
nique, I chose not to explore the likely effects of such norms if the political entities
involved (i.e., those responsible for designing a solution to the problem) had decided to
use different operational techniques. Therefore, this Note will not elaborate on what
would be the different formal consequences of the adoption of a different operational
technique, such as the grievance-remedial, the penal, the public-benefit conferral or the
private-arranging technique.
58. SUMMERS, supra note 16, at 3.
59. SUMMERS, supra note 10, at 36-38.
60. See Federal Reserve Act of 1966, 12 U.S.C. §§ 221-28 (2000); see also discussion
infra subsection Il(B)(3) and sources cited infra note 67.
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reason why the administrative-regulatory technique was adopted in this
area. The essential time-boundedness of monetary policy would preclude
the adoption of any other technique as a means to achieve the goal of price
stability. The grievance-remedial, and the penal techniques, which are
past-event oriented, would be of little help here. For instance, the affected
citizen himself could do very little through the grievance-remedial tech-
nique (other than casting a vote) to reverse the nefarious effects on his life
of the onset of inflation that opportunistic interest rate decisions caused.
One would imagine the potentially affected citizen might prefer to adopt a
preventive strategy if he could.
The problem with that notion is that the "[affected citizen] will not
even be able to identify the risks in advance . .. [and] even when the
affected citizen does know something is wrong he may be unable, alone, to
do anything about it in advance."'6 ' Public choice literature, through the
concepts of "free-riding" and "lack of encompassing interest," has cast
some light on why individuals are discouraged to act for the collective sake
when their individual costs far exceed their potential individual benefits. 62
Therefore, one can appreciate why modern Western democracies
chose the administrative-regulatory technique as the basic operational tech-
nique to attack the problem at hand. In doing so, they chose the appropri-
ate purposive systematic arrangement to deal with a particular problem,
that is, they chose the appropriate form of operational technique. 63
However, the eventual efficacy of this legal operational technique
should not solely be credited to the choice of appropriate form. While no
other basic operational technique would be likely to produce the fantastic
results the chosen technique brought about, it seems quite unlikely that the
administrative-regulatory technique alone, without relying on the set of
non-formal elements then available in the West, would produce similar
results. These non-formal elements are: the content of the rules that pre-
scribe choices of policy grounded on sophisticated substantive and quanti-
tative economic analyses; the high level of expertise of the personnel who
make up central banks; the high sophistication of today's communicative
devices; the perhaps even more highly sophisticated financial markets, and
many more. 64 In monetary policy, perhaps more than in any other policy
area, choosing a form that is least likely to fall victim to short-term electo-
ral opportunism, whatever its political (substantive) origin, has generally
been identified with long-term downward trends in interest rates. The mar-
ket's approval or repudiation tends to be immediate, 6 5 and the growing
61. ROBERT S. SUMMERS & CHARLES G. HOWARD, LAW: ITS NATURE, FUNCTIONS, AND
LIMITS 199-200 (2d ed. 1972).
62. See generally MANCUR OLSON, JR., THE LOGIC OF COLLECTIVE ACTION: PUBLIC
GOODS AND THE THEORY OF GROUPS (1965); MANCUR OLSON, JR., THE RISE AND DECLINE OF
NATIONS (1982).
63. See SUMMERS, supra note 28.
64. See Fiscal Flexibility: Could Finance Ministers Learn a Few Tricks from Central
Bankers?, supra note 54, at 80.
65. Note that markets perceive an independent central bank's commitment to price
stability as its source of credibility. See id.
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prosperity of the West owes much to the choice of appropriate form.
2. The Compounding Nature of Choices of Form in Macroeconomic Policy
As demonstrated above, Congress's choosing the administrative-regulatory
technique is itself an example of form-constrained choice. In essence, Con-
gress's need to solve the problem of time-inconsistent goals demanded the
design of a largely formal mechanism and solution that was formal in
nature, and these needs largely determined the formal operational tech-
nique to be chosen. Furthermore, the choice of this technique is also a
form-constraining choice, for it affects formal decisions, which have to be
made further down the line, such as, who gets to participate in law-making,
which legislative institution is qualified to prepare and draft the law, under
what procedures, and under what circumstances the law is to be enacted,
how it will be disseminated to its primary addressees, and so forth.
But perhaps more importantly, as we observed in the choice of the
administrative-regulatory technique as the basic formal operational tech-
nique, all these choices of form will greatly affect the content of what is
produced. 66
Choosing the administrative-regulatory technique determines the
institutional, the preceptual, the methodological forms, and the non-formal
resources that will necessarily have to be brought to bear in order to pre-
pare, enact and implement laws and regulations in this policy area,
whatever their substantive content. By providing for the involvement of at
least one regulatory agency (i.e., the central bank), this particular tech-
nique necessarily requires the granting of specific authority, normally dis-
charged by means of a statute, which in turn, requires a preexisting
legislative body. These are all choices of form.
Implementation of an interest rate policy (whatever its content) by a
government agency will require a nationwide scope of authority. In the
United States, this amounts to limiting the choice of institutional form to
one single legislative body-Congress. That institution, in turn, has its
own compositional, procedural, and structural forms (committee system,
and other ancillary institutions, such as the General Accounting Office),
and these forms themselves interact with non-formal elements such as
political parties, lobbyists, advocacy groups, personnel, facilities-all
affected by the initial choice of legal form and clearly willing to affect the
form and content of the legislative outcome. Thus one would expect the
different layers of form and the interaction of these forms with non-formal
elements throughout this long process to have a strong and salutary
imprint on the final policy content of the proposed law.
66. This is surely in line with Summers' insight that good form begets good content:
It is possible for those who govern to adhere to the principles of the rule of law,
yet for the content of the first-order [i.e., substantive] law they create and imple-
ment be bad or unsound... adherence to most of the principles of the rule of
law, themselves form-oriented in content, generally tends to beget good policy
content in the law being made.
SUMMERS, supra note 20, at 34.
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3. Application of the Law by its Addressees in Ordinary Cases and the
Implementative Role of Administrative Officials
One would expect Congress to elaborate a statutory scheme (preceptual
form) for the administrative agency that both delegates and establishes lim-
its on the authority to set interest rates. 67 Because of the clearly forward-
looking nature of interest rate policy, and because of the difference in
levels of expertise of the principal (Congress) relative to that of its agent
(the Federal Open Market Committee (FOMC)) 68 , the language of the stat-
ute (i.e., its encapsulatory and expressional form) is likely to be broad,
with the occasional use of technical terms. Once again, we can see how the
initial choice of form affects final legislative content.
A statutory rule of the type indicated above is more than the source of
authority for the administrative agency. 69 It also provides that agency with
a clear legal basis for action.70 Therefore, for a member of the board of
governors of the Federal Reserve, its final addressee, this rule would gener-
ally be internalized as follows: if you believe, on the basis of economic data
available, that inflationary pressures are emerging in the economy, then
you should vote for a present increase in the rate of interest to a level that is
targeted to offset the likely impact of the inflationary pressure expected to
occur. The converse movement applies if deflationary or recession pres-
sures are forecasted.
This is obviously a simplified version of the combined operation of
federal statutes, and its ancillary regulations in this area. 7' But what is
important, as we explain this complex chain of reasoning, is that the stat-
67. Congress did so in the Federal Reserve Act of 1966, 12 U.S.C. §§ 221 et seq.
(2000). Section 263(a) establishes the FOMC, "which shall consist of the members of
the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System and five other representatives of
the Federal Reserve banks .. ." d. at § 263(a). It also gives the FOMC the power to take
measures to affect the supply of money. Id. at §§ 263(b) & (c). Interestingly, the Dis-
trict of Columbia Circuit upheld Congress' authority to delegate to private persons the
power to affect the supply of money, by allowing the board of directors of the Federal
Reserve banks, rather than the President, to choose such private persons, pending con-
firmation by the Senate. Melcher v. Fed. Open Mkt. Comm., 836 F.2d 561 (D.C. Cir.
1987). The Melcher court held that where "a legislator could obtain substantial relief
from his fellow legislators through the legislative process itself, then it is an abuse of
discretion for a court to entertain [the legislator's] action." Id. at 565. The practical
consequence of this decision is that, to date, there has been no successful challenge to
the FOMC's power to independently set interest rates.
68. 12 U.S.C. § 263 (2000).
69. See GELHORN & BYSE, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW 192-93 (9th ed. 1995).
70. Id.
71. Actually, in the United States, as in other Western countries, the Federal Reserve
("the Fed"), or the central bank, affects interest rates by a rather roundabout procedure:
"The reason the Fed can set interest rates is that it has a monopoly on supplying bank
reserves. Banks are required to hold a fraction of the money deposited with them in a
reserve account at the Fed .. " Monopoly Power over Money, ECONOMIST, Nov. 20, 1999,
at 95. The federal funds rate is the "interest rate at which banks' demand for reserves
matches the Fed's supply .... [and] is also the rate at which banks lend reserves to each
other overnight." Id. To understand how the Fed works, it is important to remember
that the banks' legal requirement to keep reserves in the central bank necessarily causes
the demand for reserves to exceed supply of those reserves at all times:
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ute is perfectly suited to its final addressee, and that it has achieved its
intended result. It truly is amazing how previous choices of appropriate
form greatly facilitate the addressee's capacity to not only determine the
meaning of the rule, but to classify "factual circumstances as falling under
the terms of the rule' 72 and act accordingly.
C. Consequences of Appropriate Legal Form
The set of formal choices responsible for the removal of interest rate deci-
sions from the political process in Western societies appears to be a func-
tion of the maturity of their political systems. However, the greater
economic vitality of the West, 7 3 which this quiet revolution has helped to
bring, is certainly not its only success story. Perhaps it is not even its
biggest achievement. The furthering of values associated with democracy,
the rule of law, and rationality are the greatest beneficiaries of appropriate
form.
Substantively, the choice of appropriate form in the conduct of
macroeconomic policy has introduced a definite element of fiscal austerity
in politics. Indeed, to the extent that central bank autonomy increases the
costs of generating short-term expansionary cycles, politicians are forced
to operate within monetary as well as fiscal constraints. 74 While politi-
cians do disagree on how to allocate resources, they no longer can or are
willing to advocate economic programs that in the past have been closely
associated with inflationary periods. Democracy has thus been strength-
ened as economic-based sources of political instability have become less
likely and, more importantly, because compliance with formal rules has
become automatic with little need for judicial intervention. 7 5 This devel-
opment illustrates not only the high level of self-compliance achieved-a
The Fed controls [the federal funds rate] by changing the supply of reserves
through sales and purchases of government securities, known as open-market
operations ....
When the Fed wants to raise the federal funds rate [and hence increase short-
term interest rates], it sells government securities. It receives payment by reduc-
ing the account of the buyer's bank, which reduces the volume of reserves in the
banking system ....
Id. Thus, banks must make new reserve deposits in order to comply with legal require-
ments. Id. However, to lower rates, the Fed buys back securities, "which increases
banks' reserves and bids down interest rates." Id. Thus, to be accurate, while it is true
that the members of the FOMC do not directly decide what interest rate increase or
decrease to adopt, their decision to sell or buy government securities is what actually
causes the resulting effect on short-term interest rates. See id.
72. SUMMERS, supra note 16, at 24.
73. In the late 1990s the "average inflation rate in the rich economies" was slightly
above 1%, with falling levels of unemployment. See Navigators in Troubled Waters, supra
note 15, at 3.
74. See Alesina & Summers, supra note 2, at 151-62.
75. Not surprisingly, Alan Blinder, an economist at Princeton University and a for-
mer vice-chairman of the Board of Governors of America's Federal Reserve, has argued
that the institutional framework around monetary policy should be extended to fiscal
policy. See Alan S. Blinder, Is Government too Political?, FOREIGN AFF., Nov.-Dec. 1997,
at 115-26.
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result which enforces the rule of law-but also how the addressees of such
formal choices have understood the complex and mutually reinforcing rela-
tionship between form and freedom-giving further strength to the argu-
ment that appropriate form serves rationality.7 6
IV. Consequences of Inappropriate Legal Form: The Case of
Argentina
As discussed throughout this Note, the ubiquity of interest rates and the
potential for their manipulation for electoral purposes combine to make
monetary policy an area in which politicians are usually hesitant to surren-
der control. 77 Indeed, in Western nations, the democratic process only
moved towards granting independence to central banks after either long
bouts with runaway inflation, economic instability, or political collapse. 78
Eventually, however, well-connected economic concerns, the wider, though
not often well-articulated, "middle-class" stake in economic stability, and
the maturity of Western democratic institutions contributed to this evolu-
tionary development. 7 9
This does not imply that societies lacking mature democratic institu-
tions, which nonetheless wish to part with a history of high inflation, can-
not come up with formal solutions to the problems of politically oriented
monetary decision-making.80 The question is whether appropriate form,
capable of yielding good content, can emerge. In other words, like in
Ulysses' ship and in Western democracies, can less mature democracies
develop self-binding rules such as central bank independence? The answer
appears to be in the affirmative. 8 ' Consider, for example, events in Argen-
76. Rationality is one of the fundamental political values-the others being "legiti-
macy, justice, freedom, dignity, and democracy" -that Summers suggests as being served
by adherence to the formal principles of the rule of law. SUMMERS, supra note 20, at 33.
Curiously, Kenneth Shepsle, one of the paramount scholars interested in state reform,
emphasizes the crucial importance of rationality in public policy. KENNETH A. SHEPSLE,
THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF STATE REFORM - POLITICAL TO THE CORE 1-20 (Inst. For Soc.
Research: The Political Econ. Working Papers Archive, Working Paper No. 19980001,
1998), at http://www.isr.umich.edu/cps/pewpa/archive/archive_98/19980001.pdf.
The difference between this view of rationality and mine, though not necessarily incom-
patible, is that Shepsle, like other substance-oriented scholars, tends to think of rational-
ity largely in terms of achieving optimal economic goals, while Summers and this author
think of rationality as also serving democratic and rule of law values. See id.
77. See ALESINA & TABELLINI, supra note 2; Alesina & Sachs, supra note 2; Alesina &
Summers, supra note 2.
78. See ELSTER supra note 13, at 162-65.
79. For example, The Economist noted that "it is now widely accepted that monetary
policy is best set by an independent central bank, insulated from political pressures."
Navigators in Troubled Waters, supra note 15.
80. Some scholars focus on the use of a different kind of formal legal arrangement
as a tool to combat inflation: devolving power or decentralization. See, e.g., DANIEL TRE-
iSMAN, DECENTRALIZATION AND INFLATION IN DEVELOPED AND DEVELOPING COUNTRIES (Insti-
tute for Social Research: The Political Economy Working Papers Archive, Working Paper
No. 19980016, 1998), at http://www.isr.umich.edu/cps/pewpa/archive/archive_98/19
980015.pdf.
81. The Czech Republic, for instance, conferred independence on its central bank in
its constitution. ELSTER, supra note 13, at 150.
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tina. Faced with the total loss of credibility from decades of runaway infla-
tion, which culminated in the early resignation of President Rafil Alfonsin,
the Menen administration, after some initial, less drastic reforms, intro-
duced a currency board in 1991.82 Argentina's creation of a currency
board offers strong evidence that less mature democracies can engage in
monetary self-binding.8 3 Thus, the relevant question becomes whether
Argentina's strict currency board constituted appropriate legal form. 8 4
A. Surrendering the Sovereign Right to Conduct Macroeconomic Policy:
Argentina's Resort to a Strict Currency Board as a Case of
Inappropriate Form
Unlike a conventional central bank which can print money at will, a cur-
rency board issues domestic notes and coins only when there are foreign
exchange reserves to back them up.8 5 Under such a system, interest rates
will adjust automatically, that is, independently of monetary authority
action. This is so because when investors want to switch out of the domes-
tic currency into, say dollars, the supply of domestic currency will auto-
matically shrink. This will cause interest rates to rise, until eventually it
becomes attractive for investors, both foreign and local, to hold local cur-
82. A currency board is the title given to the commitment of a government to convert
its domestic currency on demand at a fixed exchange rate. To make this commitment
credible, the currency board holds reserves of hard foreign currency (or gold or some
other liquid asset) equal at the fixed rate of exchange to at least 100% of the domestic
currency issued. From 1991 to the final days of 2001 the Argentine Peso, for instance,
had been convertible into one American dollar. For a comparative discussion on cur-
rency boards, see generally D. Mihalke, Currency Board Arrangements: Issues and Exper-
iences, IMF OCCASIONAL PAPER 151, Sept. 1997.
83. Other examples of monetary policy self-binding are Mexico's (1993) and Brazil's
(1999) combination of floating currencies with fixed inflationary targets that have made
significant, though not yet complete, advances toward central bank independence. See,
e.g., Floating with an Anchor: The Latest Exchange-Rate Fad in Emerging Economies is for
Flexible Currencies, but Fixed Inflation Targets. Will it last?, ECONOMIST, Jan. 29, 2000, at
88 [hereinafter Floating with an Anchor]. The Chilean experience with central bank
autonomy also illustrates that young democracies can coexist with monetary policy self-
binding. Id. Note, however, that it was the Pinochet regime that had first approved
measures establishing an independent central bank in 1989. See Delia M. Boylan, Hold-
ing Democracy Hostage: Central Bank Autonomny in the Transition from Authoritarian Rule
(1998), at http://,Aww.harrisschool.uchicago.edu/pdf/wp-boylan.pdf. Other than the
surrender of power, this was perhaps the previous authoritarian regime's best contribu-
tion to Chile's present stable democracy. For a contrary opinion, see Delia M. Boylan,
id. (arguing that giving the Chilean Central Bank autonomy was a means for the exiting
regime to constrain incoming democratic institutions to "neoliberal" policies).
84. See SUMMERS, supra note 10, at 39-44; discussion supra INTRODUCTION.
85. The Great Escape: How do you say Goodbye to a Currency Board? The More Stable
the Economy, the Easier the Answer, ECONOMIST, May 3, 1997, at 69 [hereinafter The Great
Escape]. This article is especially ominous; it discusses how hard it would be for the
then-troubled Lithuania to gradually remove itself from its currency peg as Lithuania
was then running a budget deficit in the order of 2.5% GDP. Id. This reasoning, how-
ever did not apply to Argentina at the time it was written, as its budget deficits were only
starting to resurface. See also Dollar Mad?, supra note 17, at 72 (pointing out Argentina's
fiscal laxity resurgence after the first five years of fiscal austerity under the dollar-peg).
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rency again.8 6 This obviously amounts to a complete abdication of a coun-
try's sovereign right to set its own interest rate. But to the Argentinean
government in 1991, a monetary policy straight jacket was seen as the only
alternative to its long perceived lack of credibility.
In formal legal theory terminology, Argentina opted for the near-per-
fect predictability and the strictly rule-based nature of a currency board to
limit the influence of politics on interest rate policy. The choice of the
administrative-regulatory as the basic operational technique, though simi-
lar in principle to the technique adopted in Western democracies, left abso-
lutely no room for central bank discretion. From the moment of the
currency board's implementation, interest rate movements were deter-
mined solely by market forces, that is, by how the market perceived the
evolution of Argentina's fiscal austerity. 8 7 The only thing the currency
board would do was assure it had reserves to back up the peso. Unlike the
more mature democracies of the West, the administration saw no point in
relying on central bank independence at a time when the government's
stock of credibility was so low. And unlike Ulysses, the Argentinean gov-
ernment did not consider retaking control of the monetary policy ship,
once short-term turbulence had been overcome. Concern with substantive,
short-term economic goals, not with creating a lasting institutional design
(i.e., a formal concern) drove Argentina's plan of action.
The Argentine government believed that sacrificing the ability to make
monetary policy in toto was the price to pay for establishing credibility.
But what was actually disturbing is that it (perhaps fearing the market per-
ception of lack of resolve) did not at all bother to formulate an exit strategy
for the long-run, that is, for when it would have managed to reestablish
credibility and economic stability.8 8 Rather, unfazed by the inability to use
interest rates as a macroeconomic tool to counter economic cycles in the
short, medium and long-term, the Argentinean government passed, with
the approval of Congress, legislation setting the currency board in stone as
its preferred legal form of self-discipline for many years to come, with no
provision for an escape strategy. 89
86. Note that when the opposite happens, that is, when there is an inflow of foreign
investment, the resulting increase in the board's vaults will require it to print more
money, thereby making the country more vulnerable to inflation. See, e.g., The Great
Escape, supra note 85.
87. To be more precise, the adoption of a currency board comes necessarily with the
abolishment of a central bank. See generally PAUL R. KRUGMAN & MAURICE OBSTFELD,
INTERNATIONAl ECONOMiCS: THEORY AND POLICY (5th ed. 2000).
88. Note that a good indicator of appropriate legal form, according to Summers, is
that "so far as feasible, . . .new written law is generally to be prospective rather than
retrospective in operation ..." SUMMERS. supra note 22, at 28.
89. In a recent post mortem editorial on Argentina, Princeton's famous economist,
Paul Krugman, strongly criticized Argentina's unfortunate commitment to a no-exit strat-
egy for its currency board regime. Paul Krugman, Crying with Argentina, N.Y. TIMES, Jan.
1, 2002, at A21. Krugman credits the IMF for this mistaken policy:
I.M.F. staffers have known for months, perhaps years, that the one-peso-one-
dollar policy could not be sustained. And the I.M.F. could have offered Argen-
tina guidance on how to escape from its monetary trap, as well as political cover
for Argentina's leaders as they did what had to be done. Instead, however, I.M.F.
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Thus, the dollar-peg, or as the Argentineans termed it, the policy of
"convertibility,"90 in combination with the lack of an adjustment/exit strat-
egy turned out to be the preceptual form of choice. That formal arrange-
ment later proved to be the cause of much of Argentina's economic woes.
However, currency boards as a legal form of self-discipline or self-
binding do have some advantages. 9 1 For example, they tend to be success-
ful in keeping inflation at low levels because the discipline upon which
they are premised helps to limit unnecessary government spending.9 2
Indeed, "in the five years after the introduction of the currency board,
Argentina pruned spending and subsidies dramatically. '93
But the lack of an exit strategy despite its initial successes, shows how
formally inappropriate the Argentinean currency board regime turned out
to be. Alas, the stability that resulted from the government's inability to
print money, and the ensuing recovery of credibility were not used as an
opportunity to gradually move from total surrender of monetary policy
towards a mixture of foreign currency and domestic government bonds.
Indeed, such a move would have opened the way for eventual counter-cycli-
cal central bank action that could help steer the country through economic
fluctuations, such as commodity prices and other external shocks.
Yet, the absence of a plan to gradually bestow discretion and, eventu-
ally, independence to the central bank (a step that we know the West did
take), apparently done in the name of restoring credibility, would actually
end up undermining it. A strict currency board, with no foreseeable possi-
bility of relaxation, left Argentinean politicians free to profit from the coun-
try's regained credibility in a most perverse way. After the fifth year of
fiscal discipline, the government began engaging in excessive borrowing
from abroad as it slowly reverted back to policies of the past. It began
running budget deficits. Political control of the budgetary process even
under a strict currency board proved too tempting. In addition, an immo-
bilized (actually inexistent) central bank was not there to shut down the
party by acting independently of short-term oriented electoral horizons.
From a political-logistic standpoint, it is true that initiating a gradual
transition from a strict currency board to a mixed regime around 1996
officials-like medieval doctors who insisted on bleeding their patients, and
repeated the procedure when the bleeding made them sicker-prescribed auster-
ity and still more austerity, right to the end.
Id. While this author agrees that the IMF erroneously supported the overextension of
this policy, the blame ultimately rests with the Argentinean government's insistence on
its policy, for the hard-earned credibility of the first five years of the dollar parity pro-
vided them the cover to the return to fiscal laxity and excessive borrowing that later
proved to be fatal. See Dollar Mad?, supra note 17, at 72.
90. The End: Domingo Cavallo's Refusal to Face Realities is Digging Argentina into an
Ever-Deeper Hole, EcONOMIST, Dec. 8, 2001, at 12 [hereinafter The End].
91. The late Rudiger Dornbusch of MIT published an article defending the advan-
tages of currency boards despite Argentina's policy failure. See Rudiger Dornbusch,
Exchange Rates and the Choice of Monetary-Policy Regimes: Fewer Monies, Better Monies,
91 AMER. EcON. REV. 203 (2001).
92. See Dollar Mad?, supra note 17, at 72.
93. Id.
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would have taken some legislative undoing. It would have necessarily
required enactment of new laws repealing the then-legislated currency
board, which was a tight knot to untie. However, the timing in the mid-
nineties could not have been better for such action. Domestic and foreign
investors would not have condemned a gradual move away from the strict
currency board regime to a more flexible currency board if the Argentinean
government took measures to ensure the markets that it would not tinker
with the fiscal discipline that had restored credibility.
Other than the lack of an exit strategy, which is not a necessary fixture
of currency boards,9 4 but which proved to be fatal in the case of Argentina,
dollar-pegs themselves have some serious drawbacks. First, under a cur-
rency peg, a government ceases to be able to use the exchange rate to help
the economy adjust to outside shocks, such as a fall in export prices or
sharp shifts in capital flows. Instead, domestic wages and prices must
adjust.95 Second, a currency board can also put pressure on banks and
other financial institutions if interest rates rise sharply as investors dump
the local currency. 9 6 Third, a conventional central bank can curtail a
potential banking panic by lending money freely to banks that are feeling
the pinch. 97
What the Argentine government did not publicly say is that if eco-
nomic and financial fundamentals deteriorated, investors and checking
account holders would no longer regard the system as automatic, but
rather, they would watch the government's actions and at the slightest sign
of weakness, they could withdraw in mass, anticipating a devaluation-or
worse, a default-thus causing the entire system to crumble. Such crum-
bling characterizes the long agony that Argentina suffered until the cur-
rency board was scrapped in the early days of 2002, after the resignation of
four presidents in three weeks amid political and economic chaos. 98
One might wonder why Argentina's formal approach to credible eco-
nomic policy via monetary policy abdication did not work when it involved
self-binding on the part of government. Was it bad substantive economic
policy, or rather, was it more a matter of bad form, which in turn begat bad
content? Of these possibilities, the latter seems to be the most illuminat-
ing. It suggests an answer that not only accounts for the bad policies that
followed the original decision to implement the peg without an exit strat-
egy, but, more importantly, it implies that a full answer can only be given if
we account for the role that bad legal form played in Argentina's economic
policy and eventual political collapse.
94. Prior to Argentina, Singapore and Malaysia successfully abandoned their cur-
rency board regimes by floating their currencies. The Great Escape, supra note 85. This
worked because, unlike Argentina, they "had stable economic policies, and strong capi-
tal inflows from abroad." Id.
95. In a country, such as Argentina, where prices are sticky, the risk of currencies
becoming overvalued is high, and exports certainly suffer, thus causing balance of pay-
ment problems.
96. See Dollar Mad?, supra note 17, at 72.
97. See id.
98. See Krugman, supra note 89, at A21.
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B. Ulysses and the Sirens Revisited
To show how abdication of monetary policy as a method of self-binding
can, and, in the case of Argentina, did turn out to be a mistake, we again
turn to the Ulysses analogy. Aiming to cure the time-inconsistency prob-
lem inherent in his preferences, we remember that Ulysses exploited ele-
ments of his natural and social environment, crafted binding rules, and
thereby was able to subvert certain inclinations that he knew would be
destructive to his overall interests but which would nonetheless prove irre-
sistible when they arose.9 9
Like the Argentine government centuries later, Ulysses not only had
his crew tie him high on his ship's mast, the metaphorical equivalent to
surrendering political control of monetary policy, but he also told his sub-
ordinates that after some point they should plug their ears and row towards
their final destination.' 0 0 In these final orders we perceive two crucial dif-
ferences between the Homeric account and Argentina's approach to self-
binding rules.
The first distinction between Ulysses and Argentina's plan is that
while Ulysses surrendered control of the ship for a moment, he left his ship
under the control of his crew, which, following his precommittment orders,
not only rowed but steered his ship to safer waters. 10 1 The Argentine gov-
ernment, on the other hand, chose to bind itself by extricating itself from
any possibility of formulating monetary policy in the future. Unlike Argen-
tina's self-binding model, Ulysses' surrender of his ship's control never
amounted to an order of such passive abandonment that would allow the
waves and currents to set his ship's course. That is, Ulysses' agents exe-
cuted his formal plan having discretion to dictate how hard to row and how
to steer as the ship interacted with the forces of the sea. What the Argen-
tine government did was dramatically different: it surrendered more than
political control over the interest rate. It surrendered state sovereignty
completely by leaving no room for central bankers to exercise any discre-
tion whatsoever.' 0 2 It tied their hands indefinitely by abolishing the cen-
tral bank altogether.
This kind of self-binding constituted bad form because it left an entire
country's economy at the mercy of forces it could no longer control. Expo-
sure to external shocks, such as the Brazilian devaluation of the real in
99. See discussion supra subsection II(B).
100. Id.
101. Id.
102. In a very strict sense, Argentina did not fully satisfy Elster's definition of self-
binding because it violated condition (v) of Elster's definition which requires "the act of
binding oneself [to] be an act of commission, not of omission." See ELSTER, supra note
35, at 46. By deciding to abolish its central bank, with no end in sight, Argentina opted
for omission in monetary policy. The government and the then-defunct central bank
could no longer "commit" to any monetary action. This imperfection, however, should
not displace what Argentina did as self-binding in a broader sense. Indeed, as I suggest
below, what Argentina did can be seen as a case of self-binding in the extreme, and
inappropriate legal form.
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early 1999,103 could no longer be adjusted by monetary policy. 10 4 Worse
yet, this type of self-binding did not eliminate the root cause of Argentina's
earlier history of inflation and its later self-abandonment to persistent eco-
nomic fragility and the government's return to fiscal deficits.' 0 5 Rather,
the false impression of stability, given by the parity with the dollar, did not
hide from sophisticated foreign investors the persistent underlying source
of weakness in Argentina's economy-the constant need for foreign financ-
ing. Indeed, the very legal design that forewent monetary policy earlier,
allowed the government to continue running fiscal deficits. The only prac-
tical difference between Argentina's hyperinflation and currency peg days
was that the government was no longer financing its debt by printing
money; it was now financing its deficits with foreign financing, backed by a
currency peg. '0 6 Thus, unlike its Homeric counterpart, the Argentine gov-
ernment not only allowed itself to be tied, but also "threw away the key," by
leaving its central bank impotent to respond to the events that would come.
The second major difference between the Argentine experiment with
self-binding and that of Ulysses has to do with what happened after calm
was restored. After the ship had sailed well beyond the dangerous waters
surrounding the captivating Sirens, Ulysses retook control of the ship.
Things were different when credibility was finally restored in Argentina.
The Argentinean government did not take steps to gradually reestablish
monetary sovereignty. Rather, it preferred to revert to its old short-term
oriented political inclinations, wasting away Argentina's hard fought credi-
bility by engaging in excessive borrowing and budgetary indiscipline.10 7
In modern Western democracies, politicians would not have enjoyed
such freedom for long. At the slightest sign of inflation, independent cen-
tral bankers would have gradually increased short-term interest rates in
anticipation of the inflationary effects of such policies (long-term rates
would increase too), thereby dooming the politicians' short-term electoral
plans. 10 8
In sum, Argentina's chance to establish an enduring strategy was
squandered under the very guise of short-term fiscal discipline when politi-
cians generated budget deficits without being themselves subject to mone-
tary policy checks.' 0 9 In the absence of an autonomous central bank with
discretion to increase the costs of generating short-term expansionary
cycles to politicians,1 1 the Argentinean drastic policy of surrendering its
sovereign right to conduct its own monetary policy impeded the govern-
103. See, e.g., Floating with an Anchor, supra note 83, at 88.
104. Indeed, as "Argentina's main trading partners devalued ... the economy sank
into a recession that shows no sign of ending, and has made the debt unpayable." The
End, supra note 90, at 12.
105. The government started piling up deficits around 1997. See id.
106. See The Great Escape, supra note 85, at 69.
107. The End, supra note 90, at 12.
108. See Fiscal Flexibility: Could Finance Ministers Learn a Few Tricks from Central
Bankers?, supra note 54, at 80.
109. See The End, supra note 90; discussion supra subsection IV(B).
110. See Alesina & Summers, supra note 2; discussion supra subsection Ill(C).
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ment from resorting to monetary policy tools that could help it respond to
external economic shocks and to a deteriorating budgetary picture.' I I In
the end, the lack of an exit strategy proved to be Argentina's undoing.1 12
This result arose because the legal form that the Argentinean authorities
chose to bind themselves-the currency board-did not include a prospec-
tive framework that provided for an exit strategy after credibility had been
restored and inflation brought under control. In Summers' terminology,
Argentina's legal approach to self-binding had a flawed prospective
form.' 13
C. Some Lessons for Argentina from Form-Oriented Legal Analysis
Summers' insight that bad form begets bad content 14 is borne by the dra-
matic economic and political events in Argentina during late 2001 and
early 2002.115 Argentina's persistent inability to adjust to foreign and
domestic shocks" t6 led to a succession of bad economic patch-up poli-
cies, 1 17 and resulting economic collapse." 8 In Argentina's long succes-
sion of unfortunate economic decisions, the budget cuts of June 2001,
which involved among other drastic measures a cut in the nominal wages
of public servants, proved to be the beginning of the end. Political turmoil
and the growing threat of debt default, did much to undermine Argentina's
insistence on the peg.
Bad form served an additional nefarious purpose. While restoring
long-lost credibility, a currency peg devoid of an exit strategy mediated by
a resurging independent central bank allowed the Argentinean political
elite to hide its fiscal irresponsibility under the guise of austerity.' 19 Thus,
the currency peg hid from the public view evidence that the source of the
Argentinean economic misfortunes continued to be the political class and
their budgetary demands,' 20 and not necessarily the IMFI 2 1 or the U.S.'s
111. See Dollar Mad?, supra note 17, at 72; The Great Escape, supra note 85.
112. See Dollar Mad?, supra note 17; discussion supra subsection IV(B).
113. See SUMMERS, supra note 20, at 28.
114. See SUMMERS, supra note 10, at 34-35.
115. See Argentina's Devaluation: From Straightjacket to Padded Cell, EcONOMIST, Jan.
12, 2002, at 13.
116. See D. Mihalke, supra note 82; discussion supra Section IV.
117. In one of a long series of "austerity plans," in the winter of 2001, the Argentine
government performed cuts of up to 13% in state pensions and salaries in an attempt to
balance the budget. See Argentina's Economy: The Austerity Diet, EcONOMIST, Aug. 25,
2001, at 31. Curiously, one would expect currency boards to achieve balanced budgets
by themselves.
118. In January 2002, Argentina at last gave up its decade-old policy of rigidly peg-
ging its peso at one-to-one to the dollar; a confusing dual exchange rate system took its
place. See Argentina's Devaluation: From Straightjacket to Padded Cell, supra note 115, at
13. For exports, some imports, and most capital transactions the peso was officially
pegged at 1.4 to the dollar and for all other transactions the currency was allowed to
float. Id. This dual system was supposed to last four or five months, after which the
peso would be fully floating. Id.
119. See The End, supra note 90 (describing how the Argentine government engaged
in excessive borrowing); discussion supra subsection IV(B).
120. Indeed, free-market skeptics, like President Duhalde himself, would like to steer
Argentina away from pro-market policies and toward more old-style Peronist policies.
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hands-off approach to Argentina's economic policy debacle.' 22 In the end,
rationality, predictability, and accountability were not served. 1 23 The
Argentinean society's will to sacrifice for the principle of a strong currency
broke under the pressures of prolonged recession and economic chaos.
Conclusion and Policy Recommendations
This Note has illustrated the extent to which appropriate form can contrib-
ute to democracy, the rule of law, and the goals of rationality and predict-
ability in legislation. In fact, while appropriate form helped Western
societies successfully check political opportunism in the determination of
interest rates, it also helped them reaffirm the importance of economic and
political freedom. Bad form, on the other hand, as the above discussion of
the Argentinean case shows, can seriously compromise these values.
These instances of monetary self-binding illustrate how appropriate
form can be, in the words of Jhering, "the sworn enemy of the arbitrary, the
twin sister of freedom." 124 The final credit for the choice of appropriate
form in the monetary policy arena should go to the mature democracies of
the West. Indeed, for so far only they have been able to engineer an institu-
tional design that prevents the polity from being overwhelmed by the
opportunistic pursuit of short-term political gains.' 25
As Jhering asserts, "[a] people that really understands the value of
freedom has instinctively realized the value of the forms it possesses and
maintains, not simply as something external, but as the very palladium of
its liberty." ' 26 Western democracies have shown that the challenge for less
mature democracies of Latin America and elsewhere is to divert democracy
from its tendency to distort public policy from long- to mere short-term
electoral goals. This means that institutional arrangements that pin "short-
horizon politicians" to longer-horizon collective goals become fundamen-
See Larry Rohter, Argentina's Crisis: It's Not Just Money, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 13, 2002, at
A14.
121. As one commentator has suggested, "[Tihe main cause of Argentina's troubles
was homegrown: the combination of a fixed-exchange rate, fiscal profligacy and mount-
ing debt is not 'neo-liberal.' It is simply bad policy-and all the more reason to avoid a
different set of bad policies now." Argentina's Devaluation: From Straightjacket to Padded
Cell, supra note 115, at 13; but see Krugman, supra note 89, at A21.
122. Despite approving a $10 billion emergency loan to Argentina in April of 2001,
Treasury Secretary Paul O'Neill later decided not to supply further funds to Argentina
under the theory that "you couldn't create confidence in Argentina by pouring more
money into it-that before it received any additional financial aid, the country needed to
change the way it approached the real down-to-the-ground stuff." Michael Lewis,
O'Neill's List, N.Y. TIMES MAG., Jan. 13, 2002, at 25; but see Krugman, supra note 89, at
A21 (arguing that the United States, "who previously encouraged Argentina in its disas-
trous policy course [were] now busily rewriting history, blaming the victims").
123. See discussion supra note 83 and accompanying text (explaining how the crea-
tion of independent central banks has strengthened democracy by furthering rationality,
predictability and accountability in monetary policy-making).
124. See VON JHERING, supra note 55, at 472.
125. See discussion supra subsection I1(C).
126. VON JHERING, supra note 55, at 472 (emphasis added).
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tally important. 1 27 This Note reveals why it is legally and economically
sensible to remove interest rate decision-making from the hands of
electorally oriented public officials.
Finally, though the study of legal form does not offer a well worked
out or fully operational plan to explain just how other similar structural
changes can be made, 128 it constitutes a useful analytical tool for evaluat-
ing similar form-oriented reform proposals. 1 29 To those interested in state
reform and especially state-initiated/self-binding experiments, the need for
attention to appropriate legal form cannot be overstated. 1 30 As the suc-
cesses and failures of different self-binding monetary policies illustrate,
makers of public policy certainly cannot afford to ignore the role of legal
form and devote themselves solely to a focus on substance. After all, as the
Argentina experience with a currency board illustrated, bad form can
clearly corrupt substance altogether.
127. Shepsle, supra note 76, at 20.
128. In fact, proponents of other theories of structural reform have for some time
recognized the lack of a full-blown theory of structural reform. See, e.g., PRZEWORSKI,
supra note 52, at 138 (indicating that his study of structural reform "had no theory of
structural transformation, and [that] empirical evidence is scanty").
129. Blinder, supra note 75, at 73 (arguing in favor of extending the framework
around monetary policy to fiscal policy); see also Bus. COUNCIL OF AUSTL., DISCUSSION
PAPER No. 2, AVOIDING BOOM/BUST: MACRO-ECONOMIC REFORM FOR A GLOBALISED ECON-
OMY (1999) (arguing that the move towards leaving changes in the tax system to an
independent agency would make fiscal policy more flexible while still maintaining disci-
pline), available at http://www.bca.com.au/upload/newdirections-avoiding.pdf.
130. See discussion supra subsections IV(A)-(C).
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